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GATT AND THE EVOLUTION OF
UNITED STATES TRADE LAW
Ronald A. Brand*
I. INTRODUCTION
United States trade law, in a formal sense, dates from the
second law passed by the first United States Congress in 1789.1
The early enactment of "An Act for Laying a Duty on Goods,
Wares, and Merchandises imported into the United States" in-
dicates the importance of trade issues to the emerging nation.2
That law, which set tariffs on seventy-five categories of goods,
takes up less than four pages of the Statutes at Large. In sharp
contrast, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
covers 468 pages in Statutes at Large, and deals with tariff
schedules, antidumping, countervailing duty, and other unfair
trade practice procedures, intellectual property rights, telecom-
munications trade, trade agreement negotiating authority, ex-
port controls, export trading companies, foreign corrupt prac-
tices, technology competitiveness, and many other matters.3
It is tempting to describe United States trade law as a re-
flection of the increasingly complex and evolving world to which
it applies. Today's world of electronic data transmissions, in-
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. The author thanks Gary Horlick for
comments on an earlier draft and John Foster for able research assistance.
1. An Act for Laying a Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises, 1 Stat. 24 (1789).
Only the law prescribing the oath of office for members of Congress was passed before
the Duty Act. An Act to regulate the Time and Manner of administering certain Oaths, 1
Stat. 23 (1789).
2. While most of the 27 laws passed in the first session of the first Congress dealt
with setting up the government (e.g., establishing a judicial system, establishing execu-
tive departments, arranging for compensation of Congress, the President and Vice Presi-
dent and the Supreme Court), six of them dealt with trade matters. An Act for Laying a
Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises imported into the United States, 1 Stat. 24
(1789); An Act imposing Duties on Tonnage, 1 Stat. 27 (1789); An Act to regulate the
Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods,
wares and merchandises imported into the United States, 1 Stat. 29 (1789); An Act for
Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes,
1 Stat. 55 (1789); An Act to suspend part of an Act, entitled "An Act to regulate the
collection of the Duties imposed by Law on the Tonnage of Ships or'Vessels, and on
Goods, Wares, and Merchandises, imported into the United States," and for other pur-
poses, 1 Stat. 69 (1789); An Act to explain and amend an Act entitled "An Act for regis-
tering and clearing Vessels, regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes, 1
Stat. 94 (1789).
3. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
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stantaneous business communications, and sophisticated service
industries is a far cry from the pastoral landscape we might em-
ploy to envision United States mercantile life in 1789. As the
Uruguay Round moves toward a hopeful close, it both addresses
issues heretofore outside the framework of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and sets the stage for even
broader coverage. As this evolutionary process advances, how-
ever, it is appropriate to return to the intellectual underpinnings
of the GATT system and consider whether the developments
past, present, and future are consistent with the theoretical
foundations on which the GATT, and basic elements of United
States trade law, are established.
In this article, I consider whether the evolution of United
States trade law, and GATT as a part of that law, has been con-
sistently with the economic theory of comparative advantage
which is invariably asserted as the intellectual justification for
the multilateral trading system. In doing so, I offer the observa-
tion that, in one critical aspect, the evolutionary process is at
best incomplete. This aspect is the extent to which private par-
ties have a role in the application of the rules of the interna-
tional trading system. I conclude that until private parties have
greater access to the rules of the GATT system, that system is
not wholly compatible with the theory we use to justify its rules.
II. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR DIsCUSSION
As we look at the evolution of United States trade law over
more than two centuries, more has changed than just the level of
the law's complexity. At least four other defining characteristics
stand out. The GATT largely defines the first of these character-
istics. Prior to the GATT, trade relations were handled essen-
tially on a bilateral basis, with agreements being made with sin-
gle foreign countries. While those agreements, predominately
through the development of the most-favored-nation clause, had
importance to trade relations with other countries, they were ne-
gotiated on an individual basis. This changed dramatically with
the advent of the GATT. The availability of a multilateral
framework in which to negotiate and apply trade rules has been
an important contribution to the development of trade law
throughout the world.
The other three defining characteristics in the evolution of
United States trade law all deal with the role of tariffs, and are
interrelated in terms of their nature and development. First, tar-
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iffs have developed from a primary source of revenue to simply a
tool for the protection of domestic business. In the first 120
years of our constitutional history, tariffs were the principal
source of revenue for the federal government. After the ratifica-
tion of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, this emphasis
changed when the income tax replaced tariffs as the most impor-
tant source of revenue. Tariffs remained primarily as a tool of
protection, and discussion of the propriety of tariffs focused on
the debate over liberal trade theory.
The second aspect of the evolution regarding tariffs is the
transfer of tariff-making authority from Congress to the Presi-
dent. With the income tax reducing the need for tariffs as a
source of revenue, Congress gradually relinquished its control
over the setting of tariffs. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 and the GATT multilateral tariff negotiations moved the
negotiation of tariffs from the halls of Congress to the interna-
tional negotiating table. Congress no longer tinkers with the
tariff-setting process, but rather, views tariffs as a package when
presented to it periodically by the executive branch.
Finally, the reduction of tariffs by international agreement
has shifted the focus of trade law to nontariff barriers. With the
development of nontariff barriers has come the parallel ripening
of trade relief mechanisms designed to counter those barriers. As
multilateral negotiations began to focus on defining and reduc-
ing nontariff barriers, national measures addressing such trade
restrictions were developed, either as intended appendages of
the multilateral system, or as substitutes for multilateral mea-
sures not yet developed. These national measures themselves,
and the procedures for their implementation, have become a fo-
cus of debate as replacement or secondary protectionist tools.
All of these developments regarding tariffs have set up the
Uruguay Round focus on the expansion of trade law beyond
measures involving only trade in goods. Thus, the defining char-
acteristic of complexity in the evolutionary process is directly re-
lated to the developments involving tariffs.
Throughout the development of United States trade law
alongside the maturation of the GATT system, questions have
arisen about the process of development. Each of the character-
istics mentioned here has been subject to fluctuations in policy
between free trade and protectionism throughout United States
history. For instance, recent separate negotiation of bilateral and
regional free trade agreements, and regional "economic areas,"
1992]
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challenge the multilateral underpinnings of the GATT. While
some argue that evolution on multiple fronts can be consistent
with a primary focus on the multilateralism of the GATT, others
see a fragile GATT structure weakened further by parallel at-
tention to bilateral and regional arrangements.
Regardless of how one views the multiple efforts to coordi-
nate matters with our trading partners, the agreements emanat-
ing from those efforts provide confirmation of important evolu-
tionary trends that raise critical questions about the direction of
trade law generally. Throughout United States history, the ten-
sion between protection of domestic industries and a desire for
efficient access to goods and services at the lowest possible cost
has defined fluctuations in trade policy.4 As the pendulum has
oscillated between protectionism and free trade, economic the-
ory has been used to justify limits on national regulation of in-
ternational trade. Economists often imply a synergistic relation-
ship in the fact that both the signing of the Declaration of
Independence and the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of
Nations occurred in 1776. Just as the colonists were rebelling
against the English crown, Smith was rebelling against tradi-
tional mercantilist theory and setting the stage for David Ri-
cardo's exposition of the theory of comparative advantage.5 This
latter theory has provided the foundation for liberal trading pol-
icies throughout United States history.
More important for the discussion here, the theory of com-
parative advantage provides the justification for, and the expla-
nation of, the multinational regulatory system set up in the
GATT.6 This theory tells us that even if one country is more
4. See, e.g., RICHARD W. THOMPSON, THE HISTORY OF PROTECIVE TARIFF LAWS
(1888).
5. Adam Smith, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University, is seen as the
"first major figure of classical Economics." Bo SODERSTEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 11
n.2 (1980) [hereinafter SODERSTEN]. In THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), he preached the'
benefits of "the invisible hand" in the unhampered market. David Ricardo published
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817. It is in chapter 7 of this work,
"On Foreign Trade," that he expounds the theory of comparative advantage. In 1815,
Robert Torrens had published a pamphlet, Essay on the External Corn Trade, contain-
ing perhaps the first formulation of the theory of comparative advantage. SODERSTEN
supra, at 11 n.3.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in IV GATT, BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, BISD, 1-78 (1969) [hereinafter GATT]. "[B]oth
U.S. foreign trade laws and the GATT essentially attempt to implement the law of com-
parative advantage." BRUCE E. CLUBB, 1 UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAW lxiii (1991)
[hereinafter CLUBB]. For further discussion of the relationship between comparative ad-
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productive than another in all lines of production, both can ben-
efit from trade. It provides the argument in favor of United
States adherence to the GATT system and against protectionist
domestic legislation that would serve to close United States mar-
kets or unfairly aid United States businesses in international
markets. While comparative advantage theory has been ques-
tioned and challenged, it remains the accepted economic expla-
nation for trade among nations.7 Thus, it provides us with the
template by which we can take the measure of both multina-
tional and national regulatory principles governing international
trade.
Trade specialists generally accept that the theory of com-
parative advantage defines the benefits of trade among nations
and that any regulatory framework should seek to maximize the
benefits available from trade." Thus, they implicitly assume that
the test of the evolution of trade laws is the extent to which
those laws bring us closer to an environment that allows the in-
visible hand to operate in the unhampered market. When we
consider evolution of the law, unless we have wholly redefined
our purposes, where we are going should be consistent with
where we are coming from. With this in mind, rather than con-
sider detailed elements of the evolutionary process, I want to
look at the broader framework and ask whether United States
trade law has developed consistently with the economic theory
continuously asserted as the justification for trade.
Comparative advantage theory necessarily assumes the par-
ticipation of private parties.9 Thus, we justify our system of
vantage theory and the international trading regime promoted by the GATT, see JOHN
JACKSON & WILLIAM DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS ch. 1 (2d ed. 1986); AN-
DREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-21 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter LOWENFELD]; JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 330
(1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE].
7. See, e.g., ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAG-
MATIC APPROACH 16-23 (1989). See also SODERSTEN, supra note 5, at 11 ("The theory of
comparative advantage, or, as it is sometimes called, the theory of comparative costs, is
one of the oldest, still unchallenged theories of economics."). But see Jal Hagelstam,
Mercantilism Still Influences Practical Trade Policy at the End of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 95 (1991) (asserting that, despite statements supporting com-
parative advantage theory, actual behavior indicates that decisions are often driven by
classic mercantilist thinking).
8. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
9. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 6, at 330.
[T]here is no general GATT obligation for nations to increase, or indeed
even maintain foreign trade. If all the private firms in a country subject to
GATT decide to cease sales or purchases across their national border, then the
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trade laws and trade agreements largely by reference to a single
economic theory that requires the participation of the private
party. Those laws and agreements often fail, however, to provide
private party access to the system ostensibly designed to imple-
ment the accepted theory. Intellectual honesty and procedural
fairness require that we consider this inconsistency in our review
of the evolution of the GATT and United States trade law.
III. FROM THE CONSTITUTION TO THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT:
THE DUAL FUNCTION OF TARIFFS AS A SOURCE OF REVENUE AND A
TOOL FOR THE PROTECTION OF DEVELOPING INDUSTRIES
Unlike the failed Articles of Confederation,' 0 the United
States Constitution grants to the federal government, and to
Congress in particular, the "[p]ower To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises," and provides that "all Duties, Im-
posts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States."" With the additional power to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce,'" the Constitution places authority for United
States trade law squarely in the hands of the federal
government.
In the exercise of this authority, the first tariff law of 1789
recognized as its purposes both raising revenue to finance the
flow of international trade for that country could stop, even though the deci-
sion might be "uneconomic." Yet no violation of GATT would occur. GATT
usually presumes that trading enterprises will act on commercial considera-
tions and that the economic theories of comparative advantage will lead these
enterprises to extend their international trade in order to reap its benefits, just
as enterprises within a domestic economy desire trade as a means toward eco-
nomic advantage and also desire the economies of scale that trade and its at-
tendant specialization allow.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also LOWENFELD, supra note 6, at 15-16. In developing the
International Trade Organization and the GATT:
[t]he general outlook on trade issues ... was similar to the outlook on mone-
tary matters: international economic activity was to be encouraged; it was to be
conducted primarily by private firms, governmental intervention was to be
subject to a code of conduct designed to reduce restrictions; and there was to
be an overriding rule of non-discrimination.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
10. The Articles of Confederation. gave to the central government the sole authority
to make treaties with foreign governments, but allowed each state to establish its own
duties on imported goods, including goods imported from other states. Articles of Con-
federation, arts. IV & VI, reprinted in HENRY S. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 100-02 (9th ed. 1973). For a review of the early history of United States customs
law, see CLUBa, supra note 6, at 3-15.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § S.
12. Id.
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new government and protecting the infant manufacturing indus-
try of the emerging nation. While the southern states supported
a free trade policy to promote agricultural exports, the northern
states favored the more protectionist policies championed by Al-
exander Hamilton.13 Hamilton's efforts met with some success in
this first act - "a moderately protective" measure 14 - which
specifically states that the imposition of duties on imports "is
necessary for the support of government, for the discharge of the
debts of the United States, and the encouragement and protec-
tion of manufactures.' 5
Whether protectionism or free trade prevailed at any given
time, the reliance on tariffs as the primary source of revenue was
of overriding significance in the early history of the United
States government. From 1789 until the War of 1812, customs
duties consistently provided the vast majority of federal govern-
ment receipts.' 6 This again became the case in 1819, and until
the tax measures imposed to fund the Civil War, customs duties
were the primary source of receipts.' 7 In fact, except for three
years during the civil war," until the 1890's, customs duties were
consistently responsible for nearly fifty percent or more of fed-
13. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, A PREFACE TO TRADE 3 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE]. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON THE
SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES (1790), reprinted in FRANK W. TAUsSIG, STATE PAPERS AND
SPEECHES ON THE TARIFF 1-107 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1972) (1892) [hereinafter HAMIL-
TON, REPORT].
14. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 13, at 3.
15. 1 Stat. 24.
16. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, PART
1 1106 (table Y 352-57) (1975). Representative figures indicating tariff revenues and total
revenues, as well as the percentage of total revenues represented by tariffs, for twenty
year intervals are as follows (figures are in thousands of dollars):
tariff revenue
as a percentage
year tariff revenue total revenue of total revenue
1792 3,443 3,670 93.8%
1800 9,081 10,849 83.7%
1820 15,006 17,881 83.9%
1840 13,500 19,480 69.3%
1860 53,188 56,065 94.8%
1880 186,522 333,527 55.9%
1900 233,165 567,241 41.1%
1920 322,903 6,648,898 4.9%
17. Id.
18. Id.
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eral revenues. 9 It was not until World War I that income taxes
replaced customs duties (supplemented by excise taxes and the
sale of public lands) as the principal source of federal revenue.20
Given current acceptance of comparative advantage theory,
one may question why the citizens of the nation acquiesced in
the imposition of the substantial tariffs necessary to provide
such a large portion of the financial needs of their government.
One commentator offers three reasons for the rather placid ac-
ceptance of tariffs.2 First, prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, each of the states had its own tariff system. When the Con-
stitution forbade state imposition of tariffs, federal legislation
merely replaced what already had been imposed by the states.
The change in source made no real difference to the consumer.
Second, tariff duties were generally reflected in the price of a
good to the consumer and tended not to appear as a separate
charge. This was in contrast to more direct taxes, such as the
whiskey excise tax, which were violently opposed by citizens.22
Finally, tariffs had been discussed extensively in both the Feder-
alist Papers,23 and in the debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion.24 Thus, from the beginning, the need for a tariff appears to
have been taken as a given, particularly in light of the concur-
rent need to finance the federal government and a desire to
avoid any form of direct taxation.25
With the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the in-
19. Id. See also JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 80 (1985).
20. SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 62 (1983) [hereinafter HANSEN].
21. DALL W. FORSYTHE, TAXATION & POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE YOUNG NATION 1781-
1833, 64-67 (1977) [hereinafter FORSYTHE].
22. Id. at 38-61. See also HANSEN, supra note 20, at 75.
23. Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 74-79 (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
24. FORSYTHE, supra note 21, at 62-63.
25. One of the problems with reliance on tariffs as the principal revenue source was
that the times of greatest need for funds often coincided with (and in many cases re-
sulted from) events that operated to reduce tariff revenue. Thus, despite increases in
federal spending, and the assumption of the debts of the states, the federal government
retired the residual Revolutionary War debt by 1800 and cut the national debt generally
by a third by 1808. HANSEN, supra note 20, at 75; FORSYTHE, supra note 21, at 68. During
the War of 1812, on the other hand, the general decrease in trade required consideration
of taxes on incomes and inheritances. In the words of Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the
Treasury under President Jefferson, "in time of peace [the tariff] is almost sufficient to
defray the expenses of a war; in time of war, it is hardly competent to support the ex-
penses of a peace establishment." FORSYTHE, supra note 21, at 58. As trade resumed after
the war, Congress repealed the income and inheritance taxes and again relied on the
tariff. HANSEN, supra note 20, at 76.
[Vol. XVIII:l
GATT AND THE EVOLUTION
come tax emerged as the principal source of revenue in the early
twentieth century.2" With the addition of the income tax as a
source of funds, congressional jealousy over the legislation of
tariffs subsided.2 7 The Tariff Commission (later renamed the In-
ternational Trade Commission) was created in 1916 in order to
investigate the administrative, fiscal, and economic effect of
United States customs laws, as well as our tariff relationships
with other countries.28 The decline in the importance of tariffs
as a source of revenue coincided with the maturation of United
States industry. The justification for protective tariffs was sig-
nificantly diminished when the United States emerged from
World War I as a creditor nation - while Europe was immersed
in debt. Nevertheless, the nationalistic mood that followed the
war resulted in heavy protectionist sentiment and led to the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley), which estab-
lished the highest tariffs in United States history.29
Events in the United States had their counterparts in other
countries. Economists point to two "landmarks" of the commer-
cial history of the nineteenth century: the repeal of the Corn
Laws in England in 1846, and the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of
1860 between France and Britain.30 The repeal of the Corn Laws
led to freer international trade in grain, and the Cobden-Cheva-
lier Treaty led to reduced tariffs throughout Europe. Prior to
the Treaty, France was seen as a "protectionist bastion," as well
as one of the richest markets of Europe.
26. Questions regarding the constitutionality of the income tax were resolved with
the ratification on February 3, 1913, of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which reads: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
27. Some would say that Congress simply tired of the process of tariff-setting and
readily relinquished its role over that task in 1934:
Tariff rate-making in Congress is an atrocity. It lacks any element of economic
science or validity. I suspect the 10 Members of the Senate, including myself,
who struggled through the 11 months that it took to write the last congres-
sional Tariff Act, would join me in resigning before they would be willing to
tackle another general congressional Tariff revision.
Senator Arthur Vandenburg's remarks, in 94 CONG. REc. 8049-8050 (1948).
28. Revenue Act of 1916, Title VI, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756, 795-98 (1916).
29. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930). Smoot-Hawley followed by about two
years the decision of the United States Supreme Court which, for the first time, defini-
tively ruled that an obviously protective tariff act was constitutional. J.W. Hampton, Jr.
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411-13 (1928).
30. GERARD CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 15 (1965) [hereinafter
CURZON].
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The real significance of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty was
not so much in its opening up of French markets to Britain, as
in its influence on subsequent treaties with France, all of which
contained most-favored nation clauses. Between 1862 and 1867,
commercial treaties with France were signed by Belgium, Prus-
sia and the Zollverein, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, the
Hanse towns, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal.3 1
These countries also made similar treaties with each other and
through the resulting system of most-favored-nation provisions,
the concessions granted by one country to another were genera-
lized to all22
The Franco-Prussian War, cheap wheat from America, and
the resulting complaints of French farmers in the 1870's led to
strong protectionist feelings, causing France to turn away from
free trade policies. In Germany, agrarian conservative reaction
to competition from the United States added to pressure from
the National-Liberal Party's iron and steel industry base that
had been protectionist for some time.33 This combination led to
the Bismarck Tariff of 1879, which broke the free-trade tradi-
tion of the Zollverein. With a German Constitution that made
the central government heavily dependent on the Linder, tariff
revenue was one of the few sources of income under the direct
control of the Reich that could avoid Bismark's dislike of direct
taxation.
All of this accompanied tariff changes following the Civil
War in the United States; changes that were the first step to-
ward a new protectionism. 4 While England remained a liberal
trader until the end of the nineteenth century (with as few as
fifteen items on its tariff list), this changed as it too joined the
protectionist trend. By World War I, all the major trading na-
tions had moved away from free trade to various levels of
protectionism.
IV. THE INTERWAR PERIOD
The period following World War I became so highly protec-
tionist on a global basis that even the period from 1860 to 1914
31. Id.
32. LILLIAN C.A. KNOWLES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,
FRANCE, GERMANY, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES 250 (1932).
33. CURZON, supra note 30, at 17.
34. WILHELM RoPKE, GERMAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 4 (1934).
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has sometimes been termed the "golden age" of commercial pol-
icy.35 Nationalistic tendencies during the war remained as na-
tions emerged with higher tariffs than when the war had begun.
Although these tariffs were reduced somewhat prior to the early
1930's, economic depression was met with increased nationalism
and resulting increased protectionism. The United States was
again a leader in this process, with the 1921 Emergency Tariff
Act,36 imposing high duties on agricultural imports, and the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922,11 which granted the
President authority to adjust rates up or down by 50 percent.
This authority was used in eight years to increase rates thirty
two times and to decrease rates only five times.38
The increased tariffs of Smoot-Hawley were followed by re-
ciprocal increases throughout the world. While the objective of
Smoot-Hawley was the creation of new jobs for United States
workers suffering from early depression problems, any new jobs
resulting from the legislation were probably at least offset by the
results of markets closed by other countries' retaliatory tariff in-
creases. The reaction to these negative effects of Smoot-Hawley
was an effort to temper its high tariff rates.
Realizing the need for agreements to reduce tariffs, the
United States, under the influence of Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, passed the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934
Trade Act), a rather short amendment to section 350 of Smoot-
Hawley, which authorized the negotiation of tariff reduction
agreements.39 Although the 1934 Trade Act called for negotia-
tions based on the concept of reciprocity, the resulting bilateral
agreements all contained unconditional most-favored-nation
clauses, generalizing concessions on a multilateral basis. History
was repeating the results of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of
1860. For the United States, however, this process represented a
significant development in the relations between Congress and
the President. By authorizing Presidential adjustment of tariffs
by reciprocal agreement (subject to Congressional direction and
review), the 1934 Trade Act blended the Constitutional author-
ity of Congress over foreign commerce and the President's au-
35. CURZON, supra note 30, at 20.
36. Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, 42 Stat. 9 (1921).
37. Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 858 (1922).
38. CURZON, supra note 30, at 23.
39. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, pt. III, Pub. L. No. 316, 48 Stat. 943
(current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (1982)).
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thority to enter into treaties upon the advice and consent of the
Senate.40 This grant of authority to the President has been peri-
odically renewed and today exists in the fast track authority
under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
which was extended in the spring of 1991 in order to accommo-
date the completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations.4 '
The effort to liberalize trade through reciprocal agreements
and most-favored-nation provisions did not always proceed
smoothly. In the 1930's and early 1940's, leading figures such as
the economist, John Maynard Keynes, promoted national self-
sufficiency to make the United States "as free as possible of in-
terference from economic changes elsewhere," through "greater
national self-sufficiency and economic isolation."42 Some econo-
mists and historians see these protectionist forces as principal
contributors to the conditions -leading to World War II. Thus,
the inextricable link between economic and political conditions
is apparent in times of international turmoil. This was the back-
ground from which the United States and the world emerged af-
ter World War II.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE RELIEF MECHANISMS IN UNITED
STATES LAW PRIOR TO THE GATT
In addition to being the primary source of revenue during
the early history of the United States, tariffs represented the
principal form of protection of United States industry. Early
40. Reciprocity treaties had been negotiated with a number of countries under the
Tariff Act of 1890, but terminated under the Tariff Act of 1894. The Tariff Act of 1897
authorized the President, without congressional participation, to proclaim lower duties if
"reciprocal and equivalent" concessions were obtained from exporting countries. "This
was the beginning of the movement toward Executive Branch tariff making, which would
later form the basis for the modern trade agreement program." CLUBB, supra note 6, at
52. The Tariff Act of 1897 did not result in significant trade agreements. The Tariff Act
of 1913 provided a two-step process for the implementation of reciprocal trade agree-
ments, authorizing the President to negotiate trade agreements with reduced tariffs
which would go into effect upon ratification by both houses of Congress. Id. at 83. This
simplified the common understanding of prior constitutional procedure that would re-
quire Senate ratification followed by implementing legislation passed by the House of
Representatives. Id.
41. Extension of fast-track approval occurred in 1991 when Senate and House Reso-
lutions that would have denied extension were defeated. 137 CoNG. REC. H3588 (daily ed.
May 23, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. S6829 (daily ed. May 24, 1991). See Senate and House
Vote to Extend Fast Track for North American FTA, Uruguay Round Talks, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 802 (May 29, 1991).
42. John M. Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, 22 YALE REV. 763 (1933).
[Vol. XVIII:I
1992] GATT AND THE EVOLUTION
discussions of protection of United States industry generally as-
sumed that those goals could be accomplished appropriately
through the use of tariffs.43 Just as trade was less sophisticated
than it is today, so were the methods of protection. As govern-
ments and private parties devised new methods of creating com-
petitive advantages for their industries, they also began to pro-
vide mechanisms for responding to the use of tariff and nontariff
devices by other governments and by foreign private parties.
Reciprocal trade agreements operated to reduce the tariffs
imposed by both parties in a bilateral relationship, and to gener-
alize those benefits multilaterally through the unconditional
most-favored-nation clause contained in each bilateral agree-
ment.44 Authorized by the 1934 Trade Act,45 thirty-two such bi-
lateral agreements were entered into by the United States prior
to the negotiations on the GATT and the International Trade
Organization Charter at the end of World War 11.46 These agree-
43. Alexander Hamilton listed "duties on those foreign articles which are the rivals
of the domestic ones intended to be encouraged," as the first of his "proper" means to
encourage manufactures in the United States. HAMILTON, REPORT, supra note 13, at 62.
Duties of this nature evidently amount to a virtual bounty on the domestic
fabrics, since by enhancing the charges on foreign articles they enable the na-
tional manufacturers to undersell all their foreign competitors. The propriety
of this species of encouragement need not be dwelt upon, as it is not only a
clear result from the numerous topics which have been suggested, but is sanc-
tioned by the laws of the United States in a variety of instances; it has the
additional recommendation of being a resource of revenue. Indeed, all the du-
ties imposed on imported articles, though with an exclusive view to revenue,
have the effect in contemplation; and, except where they fall on raw materials,
wear a beneficent aspect towards the manufactures of the country.
Id.
44. The first United States treaty with a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause was the
1778 treaty with France. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat.
12, reprinted in 7 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, 763 (1971). That clause granted France the
same concessions that the United States granted to a third country, "freely, if the Con-
cession [to the third country] was freely made, or on allowing the same Compensation, if
the Concession was Conditional." Id. at art. 2. Thus, concessions for which other treaty
partners provided specific compensation were available to France only upon provision of
compensation by France. The United States abandoned the conditional MFN form in
1923. CLUBB, supra note 6, at 12, 92-93. Unconditional MFN treatment was a corner-
stone of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354.
45. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354.
46. John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250, 258 (1967) [hereinafter Jackson, General
Agreement]. The agreements are listed in Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 932 (1945). Each Congressional authorization to enter into trade agreements was
for a limited period. In addition to the 1934 Act, agreements prior to the GATT were
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ments reduced the Smoot-Hawley rates of 1930.
Even before the reciprocal trade agreements process, how-
ever, United States law began to reflect the desire to respond to
unfair trade mechanisms. When, in the 1890's, Germany subsi-
dized sugar exports, Congress responded with a fixed counter-
vailing duty intended to negate the subsidy.47 Germany recipro-
cated with an increased bounty designed to offset the United
States duty.48 Wanting a more flexible response to the subsidy,
Congress implemented a flexible countervailing duty equal to
the amount of the subsidy granted.49 Thus the birth of United
States countervailing duty law.50
In the early 1900's, Congress also was concerned with the
practice of foreign companies selling their products in the
United States at a price less than that which they charged in
their home market. It was assumed that the foreign exporter
selling at less than the home market price intended to drive its
United States competitor out of business and then raise the
United States price of the foreign product. In response, Congress
first enacted the Antidumping Act of 1916 (Antidumping Act) as
entered into under extensions of presidential authority in 1937, Resolution of March 1,
Pub. Res. 10, 50 Stat. 24 (1937); 1940, Resolution of April 12, Pub. Res. 61, 54 Stat. 107
(1940); 1943, Resolution of June 7, Pub. L. No. 66, 57 Stat. 125 (1943); and 1945, Act of
July 5, Pub. L. No. 130, 59 Stat. 410 (1945).
47. Tariff Act of 1890 § 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584 (1890); Tariff Act of 1894 § 182, 28
Stat. 509, 521 (1894). See CLUBB, supra note 6, at 67-68.
48. CLUBB, supra note 6, at 68-69.
49. CLUBB, supra note 6, at 68-69. While the countervailing duty originally was fo-
cused only on Germany, after a complaint that this violated the most-favored-nation
provision of the treaty with Germany, the duty was revised to apply to all subsidies from
any country. Id.
50. The countervailing duty provisions of the 1897 Act were continued with minor
amendment in the Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, and reenacted unchanged in the
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. This was the case even though the 1913 Act
significantly reduced duties, thus retaining only the remedial (some would say "protec-
tionist") character of the countervailing duty provision. The Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356,
42 Stat. 858, in addition to raising tariffs once again, strengthened the countervailing
duty provisions by making them applicable to subsidies not only on the "exportation" of
products, but also on the "manufacture" or "production" of merchandise. SENATE COMM.
ON FINANCE, S. REP. No. 595, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 250-51 (1922). This provision was
continued with no substantive change in the Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, Pub. L. No. 71-
361, 46 Stat. 687, and remained unchanged until the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L., No. 93-
618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975). The 1974 Act for the first time made countervailing duty law
applicable to duty-free products, but added an injury requirement for such goods. It also
tightened procedural requirements, establishing time limits for making the administra-
tive decisions necessary to the investigation. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-39, tit. I, § 101, 93 Stat. 150, then brought United States countervailing duty law
into conformity with the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code.
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part of the Wilson Tariff Act.5 1 That Antidumping Act made it
unlawful to import articles into the United States "at a price
substantially less than the actual market value. . . of such arti-
cles ... in the principal markets of the country of their produc-
tion," and "with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry
in the United States. '52 The Antidumping Act contained crimi-
nal penalties and provided civil damages for injured parties.53
Proving the necessary intent requirement apparently proved
such a difficult hurdle that no successful prosecutions have been
reported under the Antidumping Act. The 1921 Antidumping
Act began the current system, which imposes an offsetting duty
on articles exported to the United States at a price less than
that charged in the home market.5 4
Smoot-Hawley most often is cited for raising tariffs and, as
a practical matter, did little else except to continue provisions of
prior acts.55 It is the current source, however, of provisions that
have become staples of United States trade remedy law. The
current versions of both antidumping law 6 and countervailing
duty law57 are amended versions of provisions of the 1930 Act.
The same is true for section 337 governing unfair practices in
import trade.58 The administrative process for antidumping and
countervailing duty actions has since been reflected in Articles
VI and XVI of the GATT and in the Tokyo Round Antidump-
51. Antidumping Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, Title VIII, 39 Stat. 798 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982)).
52. Id. at § 801.
53. Id.
54. Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-212, 42 Stat. at 9.
55. On the common assertion that the 1930 Act raised tariffs to their highest rates
in United States history, see CLUBn, supra note 6, at 117 n.1:
No detailed comparison has been made between the Tariff Act of 1930 and
the tariffs of earlier times, such as those of 1828 and 1832. Nor is it clear that
any sensible comparison could be made with the different products involved or,
if it could, that anyone would want to do it. Nonetheless, it is the conventional
wisdom that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 set the highest rates in U.S.
history.
56. Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 731-739, Pub. L. 71-361, 46 Stat. 687 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1979)).
57. Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 303 and 701-709 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303
and 1671).
58. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337). Section 337
originated in the "flexible tariff" provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922 § 316, 42 Stat. 858,
943-44. Those provisions also allowed tariffs to be applied based upon a Presidentially-
determined cost of production (rather than the arguably lower import price), and author-
ized retaliatory tariffs imposed against countries that did not accord most-favored-nation
treatment to United States exports. Tariff Act of 1922 §§ 315 and 317, 42 Stat. 941, 944.
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ing and Subsidies Codes.5 9 Section 337 has had a less auspicious
fate, having been found inconsistent with Article 111:4 of the
GATT in a panel report adopted by the GATT Council in No-
vember of 1989.60
Under the antidumping, countervailing duty, and unfair
trade practice provisions, private parties may petition the
United States Government for relief from unfair measures of
both foreign governments and private parties. Antidumping du-
ties may be imposed in response to foreign producers selling in
the United States market at less than the value at which they
sell in their home market. Countervailing duties may be imposed
upon imported goods that receive the benefit of export subsidies
provided by the producer's government. Thus, such goods enter
the United States market at what the United States Department
of Commerce (Commerce Department) determines is the "fair"
price at which they should compete with domestically-produced
goods.6 ' Section 337 allows more dramatic relief, providing the
possibility of a complete exclusion order should a foreign prod-
uct infringe a valid United States patent, trademark, copyright,
or semiconductor chip mask work, or be imported using other
unfair methods of competition. In any event, each of these mea-
sures provides relief through United States governmental re-
sponse to the conduct of foreign sovereigns or private parties.
During the 1930's, United States law developed the precur-
sor to the modern "escape clause," which provides relief from
import competition even when no unfair practice is involved.
59. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT Antidumping Code), GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 171 (1980);
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT Subsidies Code), L/6439 GATT, BISD
(26th Supp.) 56 (1980).
60. United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Panel Report of 23
November 1988, GATT, BISD (36th Supp.) 345 (1990).
61. In both antidumping and subsidy proceedings, the International Trade Adminis-
tration of the Department of Commerce is responsible for the determination of the mar-
gin of dumping or subsidy, respectively. The statute uses the term "administering au-
thority," which is defined as "the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the
United States to whom the responsibility for carrying out the duties of the administering
authority ... are transferred by law." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1). This responsibility was trans-
ferred from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce, effective Jan. 1,
1980. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69, 273-75 (1979). In each case, the Inter-
national Trade Commission is responsible for making the related determination of
whether the domestic industry is "materially injured," or is "threatened with material
injury," or "the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially re-
tarded." 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2) and 1673(2).
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Part of the Canadian Trade Agreement of 1938 provided for a
reduced tariff on silver fox.6 2 The reduction was considered a be-
nign development because many fox furs from both Canada and
Norway (the other major source) were sold in Europe. 3 When
World War II limited demand in and access to the European
markets, however, United States imports of fox surged'and
United States producers complained. After Tariff Commission
hearings, the trade agreement with Canada was renegotiated to
provide for a quota on fox fur skins. 4 Future trade agreements,
however, included an escape clause allowing either party to
avoid its bound duty obligations under the trade agreement if a
domestic industry was subject to, or threatened with, serious in-
jury by a sudden surge in imports. 5 This escape clause mecha-
nism became the model for Article XIX of the GATT. Its suc-
cessor in United States statutory law is the amended section 201
of the Trade Act of 1974.66
Thus, United States trade law developed through domestic
legislation and international agreements, both of which are the
"supreme law of the land" under the United States Constitu-
tion.6 With the GATT, however, the world entered a new era of
trade law. This era, which saw the GATT develop as an institu-
tion as well as an agreement, brought about important new is-
sues in United States trade law. To understand these issues, and
the manner in which they developed, it is useful to review the
development of the GATT itself and to look at its influence on
domestic law generally.
VI. THE GATT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON TRADE LAW DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The United States Role in the Creation of the GATT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had its origins
in a United States Department of State publication released in
1945 that included a "Proposal for Consideration by an Interna-
tional Conference on Trade and Employment."6 8 This document
62. Reciprocal Trade Agreement, Nov. 17, 1938, U.S.-Can., 53 Stat. 2348, 2389.
63. CLUBB, supra note 6, at 121.
64. Reciprocal Trade Agreement, Dec. 30, 1939, U.S.-Can., 54 Stat. 2413, 2415.
65. See, e.g., Trade Agreement with Mexico, Dec. 23, 1942, U.S.-Mex., 57 Stat. 833,
845-46.
66. 88 Stat. 2011 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251 (1975)).
67. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
68. Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment, Dept of State
19921
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formed the basis for the negotiation of a Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization (ITO).69 As negotiations proceeded,
there developed a separate agreement to lock in negotiated tariff
reductions. This was the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.
United States participation in the negotiations, for both the
ITO and the GATT, was under the trade agreement negotiating
authority originating in the 1934 Trade Act and extended peri-
odically.70 As the deadline for the negotiating authority dele-
Pub. 2411 (Washington 1945). "The earliest glimmerings of the GATT were in discus-
sions from 1942 onward between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada on
carrying out the provisions of Article VII of the February 1942 Lend-Lease Agreement,
on planning for the postwar economic and trade system." Amelia Porges, Researching
International Law, 83 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 112 (1989).
69. The International Trade Organization Charter was developed under the auspices
of the Economic and Social Council of the newly-formed United Nations, which ap-
pointed a Preparatory Committee of nineteen nations in February 1946, to draft a con-
vention to be considered at an International Conference on Trade and Employment. The
draft convention was considered at sessions in London Report of the First Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (1946), reprinted as Preliminary Draft Charter for the Interna-
tional Trade Organization of the United Nations, Department of State Pub. 2728, Com-
mercial Policy Series 98 (1946)), and Geneva from April 10 to August 22, 1947. Report of
the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 (1947), reprinted as Draft Charter for
the International Trade Organization of the United Nations, Department of State Pub.
2927, Commercial Policy Series 106 (1947). This Draft followed a prior revision of the
"London Draft" by the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee in New York
which met from January 20 to February 25, 1947. Report of the Drafting Committee of
the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34/Rev.1 (1947). A final conference in Havana from November
21, 1947 to March 24, 1948 produced the "Havana Charter," the Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization. Reports of Committees and Principal Sub-Committees of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. ICITO 1/8 (1948);
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Docu-
ments, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948).
70. After the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the United States Congress
had renewed Presidential authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements in 1937,
Joint Resolution to extend the authority of the President under § 350 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended by Pub. Res. 10, 50 Stat. 24 (1937); 1940, Joint Resolution to extend
the authority of the President under § 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Pub.
Res. 61, 54 Stat. 107 (1940); 1943, Joint Resolution to extend the authority of the Presi-
dent under § 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Pub. Res. 66, 57 Stat. 125
(1943); and 1945, An act to extend the authority of the President under § 350 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 129, 59 Stat. 410 (1945). The
negotiating authority under § 350 of the 1930 Act was extended again by the Trade
Agreement Extension Acts of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-792, 62 Stat. 1053; 1949, Pub. L. No.
81-307, 63 Stat. 697; 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, 65 Stat. 72; 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-215, 67
Stat. 472; 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-464, 68 Stat. 360; 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, 69 Stat. 162;
and 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 673. Section 201 of the Trade Expansion Act of
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gated by Congress to the President approached, the contracting
parties concluded the "provisional" General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, with the understanding that the ITO Charter
(Charter), once completed and ratified, would provide the insti-
tutional framework for the administration of the GATT.
Once completed, the Charter suffered from congressional
ambivalence toward international cooperation generally.1 Fur-
ther concerns were raised because the Charter (1) dealt not only
with trade, but also with the encouragement of full employment
and with competition law matters, (2) may have been too legalis-
tic for the time, and (3) like the GATT, contained many excep-
tions to its trade rules. When efforts to adopt the Charter failed,
the United States was left with the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade. The GATT, an executive agreement that itself
was never ratified as a treaty by the United States,72 was
adopted by the contracting parties on a "provisional" basis. 73 It
contained no detailed provisions for a body to administer what
rules it did contain, provided only vague provisions on the reso-
lution of disputes, and contained none of the Charter's provi-
sions on employment or restrictive business practices. Further,
1962 provided similar language in authorizing participation in the Kennedy Round of
trade negotiations. Pub. L. No. 87-794, tit. II, § 201, Oct. 11, 1962, 76 Stat. 872. It was
under this authority that the United States entered into some thirty-two bilateral trade
agreements prior to the GATT. As part of the 1945 extension, authority had been
granted to the United States President for three years to reduce tariffs to as low as 50%
of their existing levels.
71. The events surrounding United States reversion to nationalistic attitudes follow-
ing the perceived failure of the United Nations at the end of the 1940's are documented,
in CURZON, supra note 30, at 15-33; WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., THE END OF THE ITO
(Princeton University International Finance Series No. 16, 1952) [hereinafter DIEBOLD];
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
10-13 (1970) [hereinafter DAM]; JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 6, at 35-57. For a
general history and discussion of the GATT, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW pt. VIII ch. 1, intro. (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
72. The General Agreement was adopted by agreement to the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61
Stat. Part 5 at A2051 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950) reprinted in IV
GATT, BISD 77 (1969) [hereinafter Protocol of Provisional Application]. Consequently,
both the GATT and the Protocol receive their authority in United States law, not as a
result of any direct congressional act, but rather through Presidential agreement to and
proclamation of the effectiveness of the Protocol of Provisional Application. Proclama-
tion No. 3513, 28 Fed. Reg. 107, 115 (1963). See also Proclamation No. 2761A, 12 Fed.
Reg. 8863, 8866 (1947). Proclamations also accompanied the major amendments to the
GATT text in 1948 and 1955, specifically stating that "GATT and agreements supple-
mentary thereto shall be applied." Proclamation No. 2829, 14 Fed. Reg. 1151, 1153
(1949).
73. See Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 72.
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the bulk of the provisions of the GATT, which are contained in
Part II which sets out the general commercial policy rules, and,
pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application under which
the GATT has been adopted, apply only "to the fullest extent
not inconsistent with existing legislation. '7
4
As membership in the GATT grew, amendment of its terms
became difficult.15 Under Article XXX, unanimity is required
for amendment to Articles I, II and XXX, and a two-thirds ma-
jority is required for amendment of the other provisions. More
recent developments have come in the form of side agreements
or "codes" with their own membership lists."
The GATT is now both the Agreement itself, with its rules
for international trade, and the organization that has grown up
to fill the void left by the absence of the ITO. As an organiza-
tion, the GATT provides a legal framework for the conduct of
trade relations, a forum for trade negotiations and an organ for
conciliation and settlement of disputes.7
The role of the GATT as a forum for trade negotiation has
74. Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 72.
75. In 1955, at the GATT Review Session, the General Agreement was re-examined
and changes were made in the text. Protocol amending the Preamble and Parts H and
III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 March 1955, GATT publication,
10 March 1955, 278 U.N.T.S. 168. In 1964, the Contracting parties adopted Part IV,
entitled "Trade and Development," providing in part that "the developed contracting
parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting
parties." GATT, supra note 6, art. XXXVI:8. Later texts use the term, "developing
countries" in place of "less-developed countries."
76. The Tokyo Round codes are the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(Standards Code), GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 8 (1980); Agreement on Government Pro-
curement, GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 33 (1980); Agreement on Interpretation and Appli-
cation of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
(Subsidies Code), GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 56 (1980); Arrangement Regarding Bovine
Meat, GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 84 (1980); International Dairy Arrangement, GATT,
BISD (26th Supp.) 91 (1980); Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 116 (1980); Agreement
on Import Licensing Procedures, GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 154 (1980); Agreement on
Trade in Civil Aircraft, GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 162 (1980); and Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Antidumping
Code), GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 171 (1980). The Tokyo Round also produced five
"framework" agreements for the reform of various aspects of the GATT. These agree-
ments dealt with: 1) the role of developing countries in the international trading system;
2) trade measures taken to correct balance of payment deficits; 3) safeguard actions for
development (infant industry) purposes; 4) an Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance; and 5) an agreement to reassess
GATT articles on export controls following the Tokyo Round.
77. See, e.g., OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITs LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM 5 (1985) [hereinafter LONG].
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been emphasized by the eight rounds of trade negotiations con-
ducted under its auspices (Rounds) .78 At the same time, mem-
bership in the group of contracting parties has grown from the
original twenty-three countries to over one hundred, with nearly
thirty additional countries applying the GATT on a de facto
basis."9
B. The Structure of the General Agreement
The GATT framework is based on concepts laid out in its
first three articles. Article I contains the most-favored-nation
(MFN) "cornerstone." ' 0 MFN can be traced to previous efforts
at multilateralization through multiple bilateral trade agree-
ments following the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty in 1860 and the
1934 Trade Act."1 In the General Agreement, however, MFN is
multilateralized in a single agreement. The idea that a state may
not discriminate against trade with one foreign state in favor of
another foreign state is fundamental to the GATT.82 All other
states must be treated the same in the application of tariffs and
other commercial policy rules.
By setting up a system of schedules of concessions negoti-
ated at the successive Rounds, Article II contains both the
framework for the fundamental negotiation process within the
GATT system and the statement of the preferred method of
78. The dates of these "Rounds" and the city in which the principal negotiations
have occurred, are as follows: Geneva 1947, Annecy 1949, Torquay 1951, Geneva 1956,
Geneva 1960-61 ("Dillon Round"), Geneva 1964-67 (this round, the "Kennedy Round,"
provided across-the-board reductions in tariffs and unsuccessfully began to focus on
nontariff barriers), Geneva 1973-79 (the "Tokyo Round" focused on nontariff barriers,
producing several side agreements or "codes" that have since supplemented GATT
rules), and Geneva 1986-present (the current "Uruguay Round").
79. De Facto Application of the GATT, GATT Focus, Aug. 1991, at 10, col. 3.
80. DAM, supra note 71, at 18.
81. See supra notes 30-34, 39-42 and accompanying text.
82. Paragraph 1 of Article I of the GATT sets out the general rule as follows:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privi-
lege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncon-
ditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 6, para. 1, art. I.
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working toward less restrictive trade."' Article II expresses the
preference of the GATT system for tariffs as the accepted means
of trade restriction.8 4 Whereas the MFN principle of Article I
requires equality of treatment among competing foreign prod-
ucts, the Article III principle of nondiscrimination requires
equality of treatment between domestic products and foreign
products in regard to internal taxes and other laws.
The Article II tariff reduction process was the focus of the
first six Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, from the ini-
tial round in Geneva in 1947 through the Kennedy Round in the
second half of the 1960's. By the time of the Tokyo Round of
the 1970's, tariffs had been reduced to a point where they were
no longer the principal barriers to trade in industrial products
throughout the world. Although negotiations to reduce tariffs
were continued, the emphasis in the Tokyo Round shifted to ne-
gotiation of the reduction of nontariff barriers.85 The Uruguay
Round has continued this effort, and has been joined by a focus
on the expansion of GATT rules to cover trade in services,
trade-related investment, and intellectual property rights, as
well as goods, and a renewed focus on agricultural trade barriers,
particularly those in the United States and European
Community.86
C. The GATT as a Source of Trade Law on the International
Level
Throughout the history of the GATT, there have been dis-
agreements over both the role of its substantive rules and the
application of those rules in the process of dispute settlement.
Some have considered the GATT to be a source of substantive
83. This framework is set in paragraph 1(a) of Article II of the GATT which pro-
vides that, "[e]ach contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other con-
tracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate
Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement." GATT, supra note 6, art.
II. The schedules prepared at the successive rounds of negotiations thus become an inte-
gral part of the Agreement.
84. While Article II sets up the use of tariffs to quantify and then negotiate reduc-
tions in trade barriers, Article XI works in concert with this focus by providing for the
general elimination of quantitative restrictions, thus allowing the focus on tariffs to oper-
ate. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XI.
85. See supra note 76 for the list of nontariff barrier codes resulting from the Tokyo
Round.
86. Ministerial Declaration adopted on 29 November 1982 (L/5424), GATT, BISD
(29th Supp.) 9 (1983).
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legal rules, and its dispute settlement procedures an appropriate
adjudicative mechanism for the application of those rules.
Others have continued to see the GATT as a forum for negotia-
tion, with the role of dispute settlement described in terms of
"consultation," rather than "litigation." The second Director-
General of the GATT, Olivier Long, acknowledged the role of
the GATT as a source of law as follows:
The influence of the law pervades all areas of GATT action.
The very existence of GATT law can also have important
side-effects. Governments are likely to be more hesitant about
taking unlawful trade measures when they know the rules are
there, and that they may well come under heavy criticism for
their action in an international forum. Conversely, govern-
ments can find the existence of the rules helpful in their efforts
to resist pressure for protectionist measures, using the argu-
ment that, if they adopt them, other governments may take the
retaliatory action permitted under the GATT.
Departures from the law are frequent in the GATT. It
could hardly be otherwise with an international legal instru-
ment dealing with world trade and trade relations. Neverthe-
less, the law remains central to GATT action and provides its
underlying strength. Unlike most other international organiza-
tions the GATT embodies legal rights and obligations and con-
ventional commitments. This is its main characteristic.81
At the same time, Mr. Long, in a statement that tends to
weaken this focus on the law, states that "[p]ragmatism and the
legal approach should complement each other. What is impor-
tant is that one should not prevail to any great extent over the
other."88
This tension between pragmatic and legal approaches to the
GATT process is fundamental to any consideration of dispute
settlement under the GATT and provides important insight into
the role of the GATT as a source of both international and mu-
nicipal law. Those favoring the pragmatic approach traditionally
have viewed GATT dispute settlement as a natural extension of
the negotiation process used to agree upon the rules of GATT.
Former Director-General Long described this approach as fol-
lows: "GATT's aim, as perceived by the contracting parties, is to
preserve the balance of concessions and the balance of advan-
87. LONG, supra note 77, at 64.
88. LONG, supra note 77, at 64.
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tage and obligations between member countries, and not to re-
sort to sanctions whenever a country is in breach of the rules."89
Proponents of this approach take the position that, "the primary
objective of dispute settlement procedures is not to decide who
is right and who is wrong, or to determine a State's responsibil-
ity in the matter, but to proceed in such a way that even impor-
tant violations are only temporary and are terminated as quickly
as possible." 90 This focus carries with it a preference for a pro-
cess of negotiation of disputes similar to the process of negotia-
tion in multinational talks that lead to agreement on the rules
and tariff concessions in the first place. Pragmatism and diplo-
macy are viewed as avoiding the poisoning effect of litigation,
avoiding the bringing of "wrong" cases, and preventing pressure
from being imposed on an already fragile system. 1
The legalistic approach, on the other hand, has focused on
the GATT as a system of rules by which the international trad-
ing system ,is to operate. Violations of these rules are to be ex-
posed by specific findings, and dealt with through sanctions that
are multilaterally authorized or perhaps unilaterally imposed.
This approach is viewed as promoting compliance with the
rules,92 being fairer by preventing the stronger party from "ne-
gotiating" an unfair solution, 3 allowing deflection of domestic
political pressure,9 4 and adding the international pressure neces-
sary to obtain domestic compliance with GATT rules.9 5
In the past, European commentators commonly have advo-
cated the pragmatic approach, and United States commentators
have defended the legalistic approach. It may be that these
traditional differences of perception reflect differences in legal
systems generally, with the United States placing greater faith
89. LONG, supra note 77, at 65-66.
90. Georges Malinverni, Le Reglement des Differends Dans Les Organisations In-
ternationales Economiques 106 (Sijthoff, Leiden and Institute universitaire de hautes
6tudes internationales eds., 1974), cited in LONG, supra note 77, at 71. See also R. Phan
van Phi, A European View of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 150 (1986).
91. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 70-73
(1987) [hereinafter Davey], citing John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the
Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98-101 (1978) and Robert E. Hudec,
GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CoR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159, 166 (1980).
92. Davey, supra note 91, at 76.
93. Davey, supra note 91, at 76 n.100.
94. Davey, supra note 91, at 77.
95. Davey, supra note 91, at 77. See also Peter D. Ehrenhaft, A US View of the
GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 146 (1986).
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in resolving disputes through litigation and Europeans prefer-
ring discussion and negotiation. Whatever the reason, Europeans
have in the past tended to speak of GATT dispute settlement in
terms of "conciliation" while Americans have spoken in terms of
"litigation." In recent years, however, the general trend is to-
ward increased legalization of the GATT process, including
greater emphasis on dispute settlement and organizational
competence.96
The trend toward full recognition of a rule-based model is
readily apparent in the Uruguay Round. If the Round is success-
ful, there will be added to existing GATT rules (among others),
measures governing agriculture, services, investment regulation,
and intellectual property rights. The Uruguay Round would be a
hollow exercise if it expanded the set of rules for international
trade only to limit the meaning of those rules through renegoti-
ation whenever one party alleges a violation by another party.
Nowhere is the Uruguay Round's move toward a rule-based ap-
proach to international trade more apparent than in the area of
dispute settlement, where procedures have been tightened and
formalized with the implementation of specific time limits, and
the draft agreement provides for the prevention of traditional
blocking opportunities and a formal appeals system.97
96. See EC Wants Tough GATT To Stem Protectionism, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Mar. 6, 1990, at 9, col. 3.
97. The Montreal mid-term review included an agreement to tighten dispute resolu-
tion procedures, with specific time limits and procedures designed to reduce the opportu-
nities to block the creation of panels and the adoption of panel reports. Improvements to
the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Decision of 12 April 1989 (L/
6489), GATT, BISD (36th Supp.) 61 (1990). The 1990 negotiating text goes much fur-
ther, preventing a single-party veto of panel creation or report adoption, and setting up a
formal appeal process. Understanding on the Interpretation and Application of Articles
XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Brussels Negotiating
Text) MTN.TNC/W/35 288-305 (1990). The draft text prepared by Director General Ar-
thur Dunkel in December 1991 incorporates these elements of the Brussels text. Draft
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, MTN.TNCIWIFA S.1-T.6 (Dec. 20, 1991). Other developments have emphasized
the move toward a rule-based GATT. See, e.g., European Industry Group Calls for Sat-
isfactory End for Uruguay Round, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Oct 24, 1991) (President
of UNICE-the European Industry Federation-states that to ensure "the credibility of
the system," there must be "a dispute settlement mechanism which is semi-automatic,
rapid, objective and binding."). In addition, the recent work of Pierre Pescatore to pro-
vide a system for researching and applying past GATT panel reports is likely to assist in
making future panel reports look more like judicial decisions. PIERRE PESCATORE, WIL-
LIAM J. DAvEY & ANDREAS LOWENFELD, HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1991).
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VII. GATT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO UNITED STATES TRADE
LAW
A. Coordination of Trade Relief Measures with the GATT
United States trade relief measures that existed prior to the
GATT have been continued, modified, and expanded in a man-
ner that parallels GATT developments. These measures now
serve to provide private party access not only to traditional
United States trade rules, but also to some of the rules of the
GATT itself. A review of the instruments providing this access
presents a useful study of the way in which GATT rules have
moved from the realm of public international law to a body of
legal rules applicable to private party concerns.
The Tokyo Round antidumping and subsidies codes each
authorize the establishment, by contracting parties, of domestic
administrative procedures under which industries may bring
complaints. 8 In each case, a national dispute settlement mecha-
nism is allowed to consider both the question of dumping or
subsidy (and its injurious effect) as well as the question of relief,
ultimately allowing the imposition of offsetting duties.
Under the United States procedures for applying the an-
tidumping and subsidies codes, 9 private industry complaints
may result in the imposition, at the border, of additional duties
on the importation of goods of a foreign competitor. In this way,
private industry may use legislation effectively implementing the
substantive rules of the GATT system in order to obtain direct
relief from the violation of those rules by foreign private parties
and governments.
In addition to antidumping and countervailing duty (anti-
subsidy) procedures, the principal instrument for responding to
other unfair trade practices by foreign governments is section
98. 1979 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Subsidies Code), Articles II-IV,
GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 56, 57-67 (1980); 1979 Agreement on Implementation of Arti-
cle VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Antidumping Code), Articles
II-XI, GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 171, 172-83 (1980). In the case of the antidumping
code, complaints may be brought against the activities of foreign private parties selling
in the domestic market at less than the comparable price in the exporter's home market.
Antidumping Code, Article II, supra, at 172. The subsidies code authorizes administra-
tive systems allowing complaints against subsidies granted to foreign competitors by
their governments. Subsidies Code, Article II, supra, at 57.
99. The United States antidumping law is found at 19 U.S.C. § 1673, and the coun-
tervailing duty (antisubsidy) law at 19 U.S.C. § 1671. The Community procedures for
both are found in European Council Regulation 2423/88, 1988 O.J. (L 209).
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301 of the Trade Act of 1974.100 A petition may be filed with the
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) by
any "interested person," 10 1 on behalf of an industry, showing
that either the rights of the United States under a trade agree-
ment are being denied, or that the act or practice of a foreign
country is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and
burdens or restricts United States commerce. 102
Although the language of section 301 allows challenges of
foreign government actions other than violations of GATT rules,
its use has focused primarily on the rules of the GATT, at least
as applied to trade in goods. Section 301 provides private indus-
try with the means to bring to the United States Government
allegations of violations of GATT rules by foreign governments.
The procedural mechanism then requires that the United States
Government initiate contact with the foreign government in-
volved within the GATT dispute resolution framework (or the
dispute resolution system of the appropriate GATT Code). 10 3 If
the USTR finds that the rights of the United States under a
trade agreement are being denied, or that the act or practice of a
foreign country is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory
and burdens or restricts United States commerce, the USTR is
authorized to suspend or withdraw concessions under trade
agreements, impose duties or other import restrictions, or enter
into agreements to eliminate the act, policy, or practice that is
the subject of the action.10 4
In addition to these administrative mechanisms for address-
ing unfair trade practices upon private party complaint, the
United States has established procedures for determining when
"escape clause" or "safeguard" relief is appropriate under Arti-
100. The full coverage is contained in sections 301-306 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416. Section 301 replaced § 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-794, 75 Stat. 879 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (1962)). This was
the provision used in the "Chicken war" with the European Community in the 1960's.
See ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, I INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS 249-306 (1968).
101. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
103. Section 303(a)(1) provides that, "on the date on which an investigation is initi-
ated under section 2412(b), the Trade Representative, on behalf of the United States,
shall request consultations with the foreign country concerned regarding the issues in-
volved in such investigation." 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1). Section 302(a)(2) then ties this
consultation into the procedure of any appropriate international agreement to which the
United States is a party. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2).
104. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
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cle XIX of the GATT. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974
allows relief when "an article is being imported into the United
States at such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause
of serious injury" to a domestic industry. 05 A second provision
for relief from market disruption caused by fairly-traded im-
ports is section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, which is similar to
section 201 but applies only to imports from communist coun-
tries and contains a lower threshold on the injury test. 06
Last, but not least, the United States has maintained sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, providing for relief from un-
fair trade practices, particularly in the area of intellectual prop-
erty rights. 10 7
These provisions of United States trade law in part address
the need for private party input in the GATT process. The ra-
tionale for such input includes recognition that "business people
are in a much better position than officials to know the practical
effects of unfair governmental practices," and that formal com-
plaints and open proceedings publicize the pressures on govern-
ments to act, and encourage business people to make their views
known on necessary trade policy measures.108 Thus, the proce-
dures serve to facilitate redress of private industry grievances
based on GATT rules in the context of administrative dispute
resolution. They provide both a procedure for granting direct re-
lief, and a channel for informing the complainant's government
of concerns important to its relations with other governments.
B. Limitations on Private Party Access to GATT Rules in Ad-
ministrative Proceedings
While United States trade relief mechanisms have devel-
oped over time in coordination with the development of GATT
rules, the manner in which they provide access to GATT rules
on the part of private parties has remained significantly limited.
Those mechanisms which do exist are directed at violations of
GATT rules either by foreign governments, or (in the case of
antidumping measures) by foreign private parties. Through
these provisions, private parties may challenge only practices
105. 19 U.S.C. § 2251. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
106. 19 U.S.C. § 2436.
107. 19 U.S.C. § 1337. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
108. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, EC Rules Against "Illicit Trade Practices" - Policy
Cosmetics or International Law Enforcement?, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 6-22 (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 1989).
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and policies of foreign persons and governments. They do not
provide for private party challenge in the United States of the
GATT consistency of United States laws and regulations.
The theory of comparative advantage tells us that both do-
mestic goods and imported goods should benefit from rules pro-
moting free trade.10 9 As such, United States trade relief mea-
sures go only half way toward the implementation of
comparative advantage theory for the private party, by provid-
ing private party access only to domestic industries complaining
of competition from foreign products.
Two simple and perhaps obvious justifications may be of-
fered for this limitation of private party access in United States
trade law. First, each contracting party to the GATT may imple-
ment similar provisions, thus allowing its own industry access to
the same rules and same types of relief mechanisms. The
GATT-consistency of United States measures may be challenged
from abroad. Second, the sovereign is the representative of its
nationals in international law, and GATT rules, as rules of inter-
national law, should recognize this fundamental concept. The
system for private party input should facilitate private party
communication to the private party's own government, so its
own government may represent it in the GATT process.
The problem with these justifications is that, while they
may recognize traditional international law practice, they fail to
address the needs of the international economic system. The Eu-
ropean Community system has recognized that international
trade agreement rules may be invoked by both producers and
exporters of domestic goods, and producers and importers of for-
eign (Member State) goods.110 As in the United States, however,
European Community GATT-related measures provide access to
109. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 6, at 1-9.
110. See, e.g., Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, [1982] E.C.R. 3641,
3645-66 (Article 21(1) of the Free Trade Agreement between the Community and Portu-
gal held directly effective in challenge to the German monopoly equalization duty); Case
17/81, Pabst & Richarz v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, [1982] E.C.R. 1331, 1350 (Article
53(1) of the Association Agreement between the Community and Greece held directly
effective in challenge to the German monopoly equalization duty); Case 87/75, Bresciani
v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, [1976] E.C.R. 129, 142 (Article 2(1) of the
Yaound6 Convention of 1963 held to confer on Community citizens "the right, which the
national courts of the Community must protect, not to pay to a Member State a charge
having an effect equivalent to customs duties"). But see Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v.
Harlequin Record Shops, [1982] E.C.R. 329, 350 (enforcement of United Kingdom copy-
right law was not prevented by Article 14(2) of the Free Trade Agreement between the
Community and Portugal, which prohibited quantitative restrictions on imports).
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trade relief mechanisms only to domestic producers and export-
ers. 1" While it may be that foreign producers' rights are pro-
tected by their own governments within the GATT framework,
United States importers of foreign goods have no access to relief
mechanisms by which to challenge domestic measures. Restrict-
ing private party access to GATT rules in the United States to
the protection of domestic products represents a substantial lim-
itation on that access.
C. Limitations on Access to GATT Rules in the Courts
While no domestic administrative procedures exist for chal-
lenging the GATT-consistency of United States laws and regula-
tions, legal measures have been challenged in the courts as in-
consistent with GATT rules. 1 2 Several state court decisions and
state attorney general opinions have treated the General Agree-
ment as both binding and self-executing in challenges to state
laws that are inconsistent with GATT provisions. In Territory of
Hawaii v. Ho, 3 the court struck down a state statute requiring
sellers of eggs of foreign origin to display a placard bearing the
words "we sell foreign eggs." The Hawaii court concluded that
the GATT is "a treaty within the meaning of [article VI, clause
2 of the Constitution], so that it has the same efficacy as a treaty
-made by the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate."'" 4 Three opinions of the California Attorney Gen-
eral similarly concluded that the GATT preempts state law in
considering state and local "buy American" legislation under
GATT Article III.'5 Like the Ho case, these opinions found the
GATT to be the "supreme law of the land" under Article VI,
111. For a discussion that includes reference to the comparable trade relief mea-
sures in the European Community, see Ronald A. Brand, Private Parties and GATT
Dispute Resolution: Implications of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the US Tariff
Act of 1930, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 12-15 (1990) [hereinafter Brand, Private Parties].
112. For reviews of United States judicial consideration of GATT provisions, see
Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990) [hereinafter Brand, Status of
GATT]; Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the
United States, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187 (M. Hilf, F. Jacobs & E.
Petersmann eds., 1986) [hereinafter Hudec]; Jackson, General Agreement, supra note
46, at 250.
113. 41 Haw. 565 (1957).
114. Id. at 567.
115. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 65 (Cal. 1962); 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 147 (Cal. 1960); 34 Op.
Att'y Gen. 302 (Cal. 1959).
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clause 2, of the United States Constitution.116
No federal court has yet dealt with a challenge to the
GATT-consistency of federal law in a manner that directly re-
quired a holding that GATT is or is not either binding or self-
executing. In Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter,"7 a federal district
court found n6 treaty law created by the GATT, stating that the
plaintiff's argument was without merit, since Congress had never
ratified the GATT."" Because international agreements may
achieve legal status in the United States through means other
than formal advice and consent of the Senate, this dictum is of
limited value. Other federal cases have assumed legal status for
the GATT in disputes involving private parties, but provide no
clear analysis or direct authority for the proposition. 19 Most
cases have avoided the issue entirely by finding the challenged
federal law to be GATT-consistent, thus making it unnecessary
to consider whether an inconsistent law must be struck down
because of the GATT.120
Congress has been less than helpful in creating a record that
easily demonstrates either support or opposition to the GATT as
a source of law. After presidential adherence to the GATT
through the Protocol of Provisional Application, Congress in-
cluded a provision in each of the 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, and
1958 Acts extending the trade agreements negotiating authority
of the President, providing that, "[t]he enactment of this Act
shall not be construed to determine or indicate the approval or
116. The 1960 opinion not only implied full treaty status for the GATT in the con-
text of the supremacy clause, but also found that the national treatment obligations of
Article III were self-executing and required no further legislation. 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 147,
149 (Cal. 1960): "GATT, as a multilateral trade agreement, has the legal force of a treaty
under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution . . .and its obligations are treaty
obligations. . . Paragraphs 4 and 8(a) of Article III indicate a mandatory duty ...
Section 1 of the Protocol of Provisional Application ...does not have the effect of
changing the national treatment provisions requiring further congressional action to
make the provisions operative." Other state cases have considered the GATT, but have
not relied upon it to invalidate inconsistent legislation or contract provisions. See Brand,
Status of GATT, supra note 112, at 488.
117. 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
118. Id. at 795 (citing United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 575
n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1975)).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Star Industries, 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972), where
the court assumed legal status for the GATT, finding that the MFN obligations in Arti-
cle I of the GATT required that any retaliation under Article XXVIII be generalized in
accordance with MFN principles. Id. at 562-63.
120. For a discussion of the federal cases, see Brand, Status of GATT, supra note
112, at 489-93.
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disapproval by the Congress of the Executive Agreement known
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.' 21 This atti-
tude toward the GATT moderated over time. No such dis-
claimer was included in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The
Trade Act of 1974 stated that Congress was not implying ap-
proval or disapproval "of all articles" of the GATT, and for the
first time authorized the payment of the United States share of
GATT expenses. 22 Prior to the Trade Act of 1974, the United
States share of GATT expenses was paid out of the general ap-
propriation to the State Department.
Congressional ambivalence toward the GATT is further
demonstrated in the Trade Act of 1974, where the President was
directed to act in conformity with the GATT in regard to bal-
ance of payment restrictions, 2 ' and to give consideration in im-
port relief actions "to the international obligations of the United
States."'12 4 When Congress implemented the multilateral codes
produced in the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations, however, it
specifically provided that in the event a code conflicts with
United States law, the statute is to prevail over the pertinent
provisions of the code. 25 The 1979 Act also provided that the
Tokyo Round agreements are not to be "construed as creating
any private right of action or remedy for which provision is not
specifically made in the implementing legislation."' 2 For the
Uruguay Round, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 provides that any agreements negotiated will enter into
force "if (and only if)" an implementing bill is submitted to
Congress and "enacted into law.' 27
121. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 § 10, 65 Stat. 72; Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1953 § 103, 67 Stat. 472; an Act to extend the authority of the Presi-
dent under § 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by § 3, 68 Stat. 360 (1954); Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955 § 3(a)(1)(A), 69 Stat. 162, 163; Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1958 § 10, 72 Stat. 673, 680.
122. 19 U.S.C. § 213(d).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 2132(k).
124. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(k).
125. 19 U.S.C. § 2504.
126. 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
127. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1). In contrast to the ambivalence of Congress toward the
GATT, the implementing legislation for the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) is quite specific. Section 102 of the FTA Implementation Act provides as
follows:
Sec. 102. RELATIONSHIP OF THE AGREEMENT TO UNITED
STATES LAW.
(a) United States Laws to Prevail in Conflict. No provision of the Agree-
ment, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance,
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While the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
notes that most courts "assume" the binding character of the
GATT, 2 ' three factors leave the application of its provisions in
United States courts both unsettled and difficult. First, even if
the GATT is binding in United States relations with other con-
tracting parties, whether it or any of its provisions are self-exe-
cuting and thus capable of providing a rule applicable in domes-
tic litigation, has not been definitively determined.12 Further,
the Protocol of Provisional Application, through which con-
tracting parties apply the GATT, provides that each of them
"undertake[s] ...to apply provisionally. . .Parts I and III of
the General Agreement. . .and ... Part II of that Agreement
to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation."1 30
While the Protocol will not prevent the application of the GATT
to invalidate state legislation inconsistent with GATT provisions
(even those in Part II), it will prevent the invalidation of federal
legislation inconsistent with Part II if that legislation was in
place prior to October 30, 1947, and has not been amended in a
manner that has increased its inconsistency with GATT.1"1
Finally, potential application of the GATT to strike down
provisions of United States law is limited by Article VI, clause 2
of the Constitution, which makes both treaties and legislation
which is in conflict with any law of the United States shall have effect.
(b) Relationship of Agreement to State and Local Law.
(1) The provisions of the Agreement prevail over
(A) Any conflicting State law; and
(B) Any conflicting application of any State law to any per-
son or circumstance; to the extent of the conflict.
128. RESTATEMENT, supra note 71.
129. Professors Jackson and Hudec both find the GATT to be non-self-executing.
Jackson, General Agreement, supra note 46, at 286-89; Hudec, supra note 112, at 204-
210. For a discussion questioning this conclusion, see Brand, Status of GATT, supra
note 112, at 506-07.
130. Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 72.
131. It has been accepted that 'existing legislation' in the Protocol refers "to legisla-
tion existing on October 30, 1947, the date of the Protocol as written at the end of its last
paragraph." Ruling of the Chairman of the Contracting Parties, Aug. 11, 1949, II
GATT, BISD 181 (1952). Further, it has been determined that the priority of preexisting
inconsistent legislation is maintained despite subsequent amendment of that legislation,
provided the degree of inconsistency with the GATT is not increased. Panel Report on
Brazilian Internal Taxes, II GATT, BISD 181 (1952). On the other hand, it has also
been determined that, "the Protocol of Provisional Application did not authorize con-
tracting parties to enact legislation increasing the degree of GATT inconsistency of 'ex-
isting legislation,' even if that degree of inconsistency remained not in excess of that
which had obtained on 30 October 1947." Panel Report on United States Manufactur-
ing Clause, 15/16 May 1984 (L/5609), GATT, BISD (31st Supp.) 74 (1985).
1992]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
the supreme law of the land. To deal with this duality of source
issue, United States courts have developed the "later-in-time"
rule. Under this rule, "a treaty may supersede a prior act of
Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior
treaty."'132 Thus, legislation enacted after United States adher-
ence to the GATT may abrogate the rules of the General Agree-
ment in terms of their application in United States courts. 133
As this discussion indicates, private parties wanting to chal-
lenge the GATT-consistency of a United States measure must
overcome several difficult obstacles in United States law. They
cannot do so in administrative proceedings - the forum for as-
serting the right to relief from GATT-inconsistent foreign mea-
sures, and doing so in the courts is uncertain at best and per-
haps even impossible given the doctrines that must be overcome.
VIII. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF SOVER-
EIGN REPRESENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
The absence of clear judicial opinion on the status of the
GATT in United States law would appear to indicate that the
issue simply is not likely to be raised in private litigation. This is
not the case. It was raised, but side-stepped, by the Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Akzo N.V. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission. 3 Akzo N.V., a Dutch corporation, challenged an
International Trade Commission (ITC) Ruling on a section 337
action initiated by E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.135 Akzo as-
serted that procedures before the ITC were discriminatory and
thus violated the Article III national treatment provisions of the
GATT. The court found no discrimination, determining that a
foreign defendant before the ITC in a section 337 case had ex-
actly the same right as a domestic defendant would have in a
similar case. 36 After further litigation in United States courts,
Akzo petitioned the European Commission seeking a challenge
of United States procedures under section 337 through the Eu-
ropean Community's Commercial Policy Instrument. 137 Upon a
Commission finding that ITC procedures constituted an illicit
commercial practice, the matter was submitted to a GATT
132. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870).
133. See Brand, Status of GATT, supra note 112, at 503-05.
134. 808 F.2d 1471, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 1475.
136. Id. at 1485.
137. Id. European Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984 O.J. (L 252).
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panel. More than three years after the decision by the United
States Court of Appeals, the GATT Council adopted the panel
report finding that section 337 procedures were in fact in viola-
tion of Article III, paragraph 4, of the GATT. 138 Consideration
of the full implications of the GATT claim by the Court of Ap-
peals might well have saved substantial time and resources. 13 9
The Akzo case indicates that the current system of domestic
application of GATT rules at best raises questions about the ef-
ficiency of the international trade law system. Other recent situ-
ations involving multinational corporations indicate the need to
reevaluate basic distinctions between international law and do-
mestic law, at least in the international economic law frame-
work. In many instances, international law has developed in a
manner which means that it is no longer limited to traditional
disputes between sovereigns. Rules of international law are ap-
plied in today's world to disputes between sovereigns and pri-
vate parties. 40 The mechanism for this application is too often
ad hoc, however, with no system whatsoever being available in
some disputes. Such is the case with the rules of the GATT.
Akzo ultimately was able to obtain sovereign representation
in the GATT forum through the access provided by the Euro-
pean Community's Commercial Policy Instrument. It is not
clear, however, that such representation always will be available
for a private party pursuing a legitimate challenge to the GATT-
consistency of a sovereign measure. As indicated in the previous
discussion, administrative procedures are incomplete in provid-
ing such access, and judicial consideration of GATT issues faces
nearly insurmountable obstacles. In addition, contemporary ex-
amples indicate that the traditional practice of sovereign repre-
sentation of private interests in international law matters may
no longer be appropriate in the GATT context.
138. United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Panel Report of 23
November 1988, GATT, BISD (36th Supp.) 345 (1990).
139. As of this writing, the United States has yet to introduce legislation that would
bring section 337 into compliance with the GATT as interpreted in the panel report. For
a discussion of the possible implications of the section 337 panel report on private party
rights, see Brand, Private Parties, supra note 111.
140. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), done at Washington, D.C., Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532. See also International
Arbitral Tribunal: Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Re-
public: Compensation for Nationalized Property, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
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Recent cases involving multinational corporations demon-
strate strains on the traditional system of sovereign representa-
tion in international matters. One example is that of the attempt
by Honda Motor company to export United States-manufac-
tured automobiles to France.14 1 Prior to 1991, member states of
the European Community imposed quantitative restrictions on
the import of Japanese cars. In August of 1991, the European
Community and Japan negotiated a Community-wide limit that
would give Japanese automakers no more than sixteen percent
of the European automobile market by 1999.142 The agreement
does not cover cars built in North America. Thus, Honda plans
to export United States-made cars to Europe without those ex-
ports contributing to the market share authorized by the agree-
ment. When France balked at providing formal authorization for
the importation of the Honda Aerodeck models, United States
Secretary of State James Baker instructed United States diplo-
mats to ask French officials to allow the cars into France, and
the USTR took up Honda's case as an "American" company. 143
The Honda case raises serious questions about the tradi-
tional notion that the trader's sovereign provides representation
in disputes with a foreign sovereign. The growth of the multina-
tional corporation makes determination of the appropriate sov-
ereign to represent a company in trade disputes a more complex
matter. If a company has operations in multiple countries,
should the sovereign of the major investors, the bulk of the em-
ployees, or the related component-supplier subsidiaries re-
present it in trade disputes? Who really has the primary interest
in the matter from a sovereign perspective? If the theory of
comparative advantage is correct, and everyone gains from the
enforcement of rules designed to facilitate free trade, is the in-
termediary role of the sovereign any longer necessary? If a pri-
vate firm has a strong case, is not the prosecution of that case
(whether diplomatically or through international dispute settle-
ment) of interest to the international community in general?
One can legitimately ask whether - at least in matters of inter-
national trade - we have outgrown traditional concepts of sov-
ereign representation in international law.
A second example demonstrates similar problems with the
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application of national administrative procedures implementing
GATT concepts. Two of the leading producers of typewriters in
the world are Smith Corona Corporation (formerly a United
States company, now a subsidiary of a British company), and
Brother Industries Ltd. (a Japanese company). Smith Corona
has manufactured in the United States for over 100 years and
has long used United States antidumping laws to "protect" itself
from foreign competition.' 4 In 1991, the roles were reversed
when Brother Industries filed an antidumping complaint against
Smith Corona, alleging that Smith Corona typewriters manufac-
tured in Singapore were being dumped on the United States
market and causing injury to the United States typewriter
industry. 145
In its petition, Brother claimed to represent the United
States typewriter industry through its plant in Bartlett, Tennes-
see, which manufactures typewriters sold in the United States
by Brother.14 The case raised the question of whether United
States antidumping laws are designed to protect United States
companies (no matter where they might manufacture) or United
States workers (no matter who profits from their employment).
In answer to this question, the Commerce Department ulti-
mately determined that Brother was not an "interested person"
entitled to bring such an action. The Commerce Department did
so by applying concepts developed by the ITC in its analysis of
the appropriate domestic industry for purposes of the antidump-
ing injury determination. 47 - Even though the initiation of the
144. See, e.g., Negative Preliminary Determination of Circumvention of Antidump-
ing Duty Order, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,594 (1991). See also Anne Veigle, Keyed-up Typewriter
Firms Get Down and Dirty Over "Dumping," THE WASH. TIMES, June 7, 1991, at C1.
145. Initiation of Anti-Dumping Duty Investigation: Certain Portable Typewriters
from Singapore, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,150 (1991).
146. David E. Sanger, Fair-Trade Case Has a Twist: Japanese Charge a U.S. Rival,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at D1 [hereinafter Sanger].
147. Recission of Anti-Dumping Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition, 56
Fed. Reg. 49,880 (1991):
When faced with a standing challenge that the petitioner is an assembler
and not a manufacturer of the like product and, therefore, lacks interested
party status to bring the petition, it is appropriate for the Department to con-
sider the kind of factors applied by the ITC in its domestic industry determi-
nations. See, e.g., PETs Circumvention Inquiry, 56 FR 46594 (Sept. 13, 1991)
and Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Personal Word
Processors from Japan, 56 FR 31101 (July 9, 1991). The ITC examines the
overall nature of production-related activities in the United States, including:
(1) the extent and source of a firm's capital investment; (2) the technical ex-
pertise involved in the production activity in the United States; (3) the value
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antidumping investigation was thus rescinded, it demonstrates
the problem of line-drawing in determining, in the domestic ad-
ministrative law setting, the international trade law relationship
between the sovereign and the private firm.
Those who have criticized antidumping laws see the type-
writer case as an example of why, in a global economy, such laws
are simply unnecessary.148 In any event, the case indicates the
problems of applying measures designed to protect "domestic in-
dustries" when foreign-financed multinational corporations are
participants in those industries. Like the Honda case, it demon-
strates the tensions between relief mechanisms designed to facil-
itate the administration of rules originating in concepts of com-
parative advantage theory and traditional notions of sovereign
representation in international law.
IX. RECONCILING THE GATT SYSTEM TO THE THEORY OF COM-
PARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Both United States trade law and the GATT have wit-
nessed significant changes. The most basic change has been the
shift in focus from tariffs to nontariff barriers. The dramatic
success in reducing tariffs generally is one of the great contribu-
tions of the GATT system. Whether that system can survive the
challenge of nontariff protection and extend beyond a system
covering only trade in goods remains to be seen.
Over the course of this evolutionary process, two things
have not changed. One is the economic theory consistently used
to justify today's domestic and multilateral trade rules. The the-
ory of comparative advantage continues to provide the focus
that defines liberal trade policies and the rules of the interna-
tional trade law system. The second constant is a degree of intel-
lectual inconsistency. It is perhaps best defined in the language
of one present when the GATT was created. Speaking of the
failure of the International Trade Organization, William Diebold
wrote in 1952:
added to the product in the United States; (4) employment levels; (5) the
quantity and types of parts sourced in the United States; and (6) any other
costs and activities in the United States directly leading to production of the
like product. No single factor is determinative, nor is the list of criteria exhaus-
tive. See, e.g., Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies Thereof from
Japan, Inv. No. 731-TA-388 (Final), USITC Pub. 2163 (Mar. 1989) at 13-14.
148. Sanger, supra note 146.
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It is not just political support for a wise course that is lacking.
We also lack an intellectual reconciliation between multilateral
international trade based on a high degree of specialization and
the concept of managed and stable national economies. Per-
haps there is no reconciliation. Insoluble problems exist. At
some point we seem to have come to an intellectual impasse,
but there is still much work to be done in clarifying issues
before we can say that these problems really defy solution.
Meanwhile, men must conduct their affairs and governments
their foreign trade policies as best they can, improvising where
known methods prove inadequate. And it would not be unprec-
edented if the intellectual solution followed instead of pre-
ceded the evolution of practice. 4"
This observation is at least as appropriate today as it was
forty years ago. It is both relevant to the perception of the
GATT as a source of rules itself, and as a summation of the
GATT's influence on United States trade law. While we may
have made progress in the development of trade law, the rela-
tionship between that law and its intellectual underpinnings re-
mains enigmatic.
We continue to use the theory of comparative advantage to
justify an international regulatory system that discourages trade
barriers established by sovereigns and thus promotes free trade.
This theory is based upon the assumption that those who con-
trol scarce resources will move those resources to the production
of goods in which their nation holds a comparative advantage. In
market economic systems (those systems consistent with GATT
concepts), those who control the scarce resources are private
parties. Thus, an intellectually honest consideration of compara-
tive advantage theory in today's world would require the partici-
pation of private parties in the application of the rules designed
to implement the theory.
In 1947, the majority of the rules of international trade reg-
ulated the conduct of sovereign parties. The GATT system has
changed. After six Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations fo-
cusing on tariff reductions - Rounds uniformly applauded as
extremely successful - the focus moved to nontariff barriers in
both the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay
Round goes further than ever before, expanding from the tradi-
tional focus on goods, and addressing issues heretofore absent
149. DIEBOLD, supra note 71.
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from GATT discussion.
At the same time, however, the GATT system operates
within traditional concepts of international law and diplomacy.
Thus, international relations within the GATT are the relations
among and between sovereign parties. The rules are negotiated
and implemented by sovereign parties. They are applied in dis-
pute resolution by an organization of sovereign parties. In both
multilateral and domestic legal systems, these rules govern the
relationships of sovereign parties and generally are not applied
to the concerns of private litigants. Traditional concepts of in-
ternational law (and of the application of international law in
municipal legal systems) compel respect for the sovereignty of
each GATT contracting party. The idea that private parties
could assert rights against their own or other sovereigns is incon-
sistent with these traditional concepts. Thus, private parties are
denied direct access to those rules, and have indirect access only
when their governments have established administrative
procedures.
Traditional notions of sovereignty in international and do-
mestic legal regimes thus survive in tension with the realities of
global trade relations. One response to this tension is to continue
to live with the intellectual inconsistency between accepted eco-
nomic theory and existing international trade law. Perhaps, as
William Diebold remarked at the birth of the GATT, we will
continue to develop the system in an ad hoc, reactionary fashion.
But for those who prefer a legal system consistent with the fun-
damental concepts justifying its existence, discomfort is then
inevitable.
The two other choices are either to change the system of
international trade law to make it consistent with economic the-
ory, or to find a new statement of economic theory that justifies
denial of private party access to the system's rules. The latter
alternative would require the total reversal of the normal evolu-
tionary process. Rather than developing a rule to implement a
policy, the policy would be created solely to justify the rule. This
seems to be the questionable foundation of what emerges under
the rubric of strategic trade policy. While it is emotionally entic-
ing, it lacks the support of traditional economic values. Thus,
the only intellectually consistent choice appears to be to bring
the legal system in line with the economic theory on which it is
based.
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X. CONCLUSION
GATT has evolved to the point where it no longer fits
neatly into traditional categories of law. It represents a legal sys-
tem providing rules between and among sovereigns. In this con-
text, the GATT system has provided one of the most successful
and effective international dispute resolution mechanisms in the
history of international relations. As the evolution continues,
however, it increasingly provides rules that regulate and influ-
ence the conduct of private parties. This is not surprising for a
system founded on economic principles that necessarily presume
the participation of private parties.
While other international law rules evolved to redefine rela-
tionships between sovereigns and private parties, the same has
not occurred for the rules of the GATT. GATT rules have been
extended to private parties only indirectly through limited do-
mestic administrative proceedings. Even these proceedings tend
to reserve ultimate decision-making authority to the political
branches of the sovereign. The development of a true rule-based
system for the GATT is thus incomplete.
So long as this evolutionary process remains incomplete, we
must question whether it is appropriate to continue to justify
either the GATT system or domestic trade law by reference to
the economic theory of comparative advantage. Until we either
develop a new theory providing the justification for the existing
system - including its limitations on private party access to
rules directly influencing private party conduct - or adjust the
rules to be consistent with the underlying economic theory, the
evolutionary process will remain incomplete.
If we choose to seek compatibility between economic theory
and the trade law system, the problem lies in determining just
how that process can evolve. One might argue that this goal can
be achieved through judicial recognition that the GATT is self-
executing and thereby applicable to disputes in United States
domestic courts. But the United States later-in-time rule and
the grandfather effect of the Protocol of Provisional Application
would continue to render most GATT rules ineffective when as-
serted to challenge federal laws.' 5"
150. United States law has developed a concerted ambivalence toward international
law. This results at least in part from the absence of a rule of primacy in United States
law. The later-in-time rule exists simply because international law is not primary author-
ity in United States law. So long as this dualistic aspect of the United States legal sys-
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Neither does it appear that negotiations in the near future
will change aspects of the GATT system in a manner that will
include private party access as an aspect of GATT law. Sover-
eigns simply are not ready for such a development. As Diebold
suggests, much of GATT law has come from the codification of
practice rather than from prospective legislation on a multina-
tional scale.151 This makes it easier to adopt rules, because the
contracting parties have already participated in their develop-
ment and testing through prior ad hoc application. Yet, more is
necessary to allow the development of both GATT law and
United States trade law to fulfill the goals of the economic the-
ory upon which they are founded and which they ostensibly are
designed to implement.
As GATT develops, and particularly as national govern-
ments enact legislation consistent with GATT rules, those rules
increasingly regulate the conduct of private parties. When the
principal focus was on whether a tariff was within the schedule
negotiated under GATT Article II, sovereigns were the parties
primarily concerned. When, as in the Uruguay Round, the focus
is on such issues as intellectual property rights, investment mea-
sures, and the regulation of the insurance, telecommunications
and banking industries, the rules have direct impact on private
firms. We must ask whether a system affecting so many aspects
of the conduct and rights of private parties may legitimately ex-
ist without a corresponding system for private party access to
interpretation and application of the rules of that system.
tern remains, it is not through judicial opinion that GATT rules are likely to be applied
in a manner consistent with the underlying economic theory.
151. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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